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Managing the Tensions of Essentialism: Purity and Impurity 
 
Abstract 
 
This article will propose a new interpretation of Pierre Bourdieu, as a theorist of purity and 
impurity. Bourdieu’s writings indicate that through the adjudication of things or people as 
relatively impure or pure an image is constructed of their essential truth. Building from 
Bourdieu, we will show how themes of purity and impurity can be used to manage the 
tensions associated with attempts to impute an essence to human nature or to reality, ensuring 
that moral and epistemological significance of complexity is masked. This is the reason why 
themes of purity and impurity so often attend polarised worldviews, and why they are 
frequently mobilised for justifying and operating biopolitical processes of social stratification 
and regulation.  
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Introduction 
 
 This article will draw on the work of Pierre Bourdieu to suggest a new theory of 
purity and impurity. These are powerful themes, which have been acknowledged to be ‘under 
theorised’ (Campkin 2007: 79). The central claim that will be put forward is that purity and 
impurity should be interpreted as an assessment of the correspondence of a phenomenon with 
its essence. A pure person or thing is, in short, self-identical. The Zinc in front of you is pure 
if it is completely comprised of Zinc, as one of the basic Mendeleevian elements. The citizen 
in front of you is racially pure if you believe that he instantiates solely the nation, as a 
biological and cultural essence. To jump for pure joy is to jump in a way that manifests no 
other animating principle, that corresponds simply and truly to the emotion ‘joy’ that stands 
behind and within its instantiations. What makes purity and impurity such significant 
discourses, Bourdieu’s writings show, is that they can be used to performatively construct the 
essence against which they merely appear to compare phenomena or forms of subjectivity. To 
call you a ‘dirty slut’, for example, is not simply a categorisation of you as an individual, but 
also imputes an essence to femininity from which your behaviour indicates you have 
departed. 
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Perhaps the main theory of purity and impurity currently available to scholars in the 
social sciences and humanities for considering the topic is Mary Douglas’ ([1966] 2002) 
Purity and Danger. Douglas claims that classifications of purity and impurity are activated by 
an innate ordering mechanism in the human mind and help to preserve the social order of 
society as a whole, by marking that which is ‘anomalous’ to this order as impure. Douglas 
suggested that themes of impurity become attached, as a ‘spontaneous by-product’ of an 
instinctual human drive for order, to that which is ‘rejected from our normal scheme of 
classification’ ([1966] 2002: 45, 50; [1968] 1975: 58). She presents a functionalist account, 
that this process operates for the overall ‘advantage of society at large’ ([1966] 2002: 48, 
168).  
Yet there have been repeated calls for further theoretical reflections on the topic of 
purity and impurity beyond Purity and Danger, including from Douglas herself. Since the 
publication of Purity and Danger, a variety of scholars across the social sciences have 
criticised Douglas’ theory for making unmediated explanatory links between categorical 
systems and the social structure of society as a totality. Valeri (2000: 71) posits, for example, 
that bypassing the realm of social practices leads Purity and Danger ‘to speak of “the 
system”, of “form”, or of “order” as if they were one monolithic thing’. In fact, ‘there are 
many coexisting orders of classification; what is residual to one may be central to another’. 
Each of these orders of classification is marked by a dynamic interplay of relations of power. 
Purity and impurity are not the result of a single homeostatic process (Valeri 2000: 71). 
Hetherington (2004) also criticises Douglas’ theory in ways that that agree with Valeri. He 
argues that the anomaly theory of purity and impurity offers a flawed analysis of processes of 
categorisation. This has been largely because Douglas presumes that the classificatory system 
is ‘a stable and representable thing’, and prior to the anomalies that it designates. As a result, 
she ‘misses the ongoing way in which order is made as uncertain process’ (2004: 163).  
Douglas ([1990] 1996; 1991; 1992) herself agreed with her critics that the two central 
issues with the anomaly theory which cause its flawed account of power and categorisation 
were the assumption that society is a unitary whole, and the assumption that there exists a 
unitary ‘ordering’ mechanism within the human mind. In an informal seminar in 1997, 
Douglas retracted both assumptions. Furthermore, as a logical consequence of these 
retractions, Douglas further admitted that there is no universal, ‘intrinsic value to purity’ for 
either the individual or for society: ‘the only thing universalistic about purity is the tendency 
to use it as a weapon or tool’ (Douglas 1997). Douglas herself concluded that there exists a 
pressing need for further social theoretical reflections on the topic. The subsequent year, 
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Douglas publically retracted the claim that there is a universal human or societal urge for a 
complete and ordered cognitive system. She asserted that the most common response to 
social or cognitive anomalies tends to be simply to ‘tolerate ambiguity’ (Douglas & Ney 
1998: 15). 
Taking a more historicist approach than Douglas to the topic, in Moral Purity and 
Persecution in History (2000), Barrington Moore Jr. insists upon the foundational importance 
of themes of purity and impurity to the form taken by Western civilisation. He suggests that, 
from their biblical origins, these concepts have indelibly shaped Western society, 
contributing to intolerance and extremism through the absolutist world-view that they 
mandate. He expresses exasperation that, given their pressing importance, purity and impurity 
have received so little attention from social scientists and social theorists. He contends that 
the Western notions of purity and impurity have served as an ‘indispensible’ antecedent to 
moral catastrophes such as the Wars of Religion in the sixteenth century and the rise of 
Nazism and Stalinism in the twentieth century (2000: 26, 132).  
Whilst we do not wish to follow Moore in suggesting that discourses of purity and 
impurity have endured over millennia at the beating heart of a Western civilisation, we do 
think that they have great importance for many modern Western societies. In this article we 
will present a new interpretation of Bourdieu’s writings, excavating an account of purity and 
impurity. Other theorists could have been chosen. Elsewhere one of us have examined the 
work of Kristeva, Girard and Agamben, considering their contributions to the social theory of 
purity and impurity. Other contemporary thinkers have also looked for resources for 
theorising the topic of purity and impurity. Karakayali (2006), for example, recommends 
Simmel’s work on the figure of the ‘stranger’ as apposite to the study of representations of 
dirt and impurity. We have chosen to engage in an interpretation of Bourdieu here because of 
what we see as his particular acuity in examining the role played by discourses of purity and 
impurity in the differentiation of both fields of practice and forms of subjectivity. He does not 
examine the stark dichotomy between ‘us’ and ‘strangers’, as do Kristeva, Girard, Agamben 
and Karakayali. Instead, he explores the incremental classification of subjects, embedded 
within a plurality of fields at any given time, as pure or impure. Prior commentators on 
Bourdieu have failed to draw out his insights into this topic, however; as Fowler (1997: 64) 
rightly states, these insights often remain at the level of ‘hints’ in Bourdieu’s texts. Yet, as we 
aim to demonstrate, interpretation could productively bring this theme into focal attention. 
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Purity, impurity and practice  
 
In ‘The Genesis and Structure of the Religious Field’, Bourdieu presents a general 
account of the origin of purity and impurity discourses. He hypothesises that appeal to a 
realm that transcends ordinary life initially occurred through ‘magic’ before the advent of 
institutionally organised religion. He follows Weber in defining magic as the direct attempt to 
master nature through symbolic practices for the purposes of immediate utility ([1971a] 1991: 
13 cf. Weber [1922] 1968: 399-400, 403). He suggests that in early agricultural societies, 
everyday life was firmly embedded in nature, with its cyclical patterns, spatial dispersion and 
immediate needs. This worked against the production of abstract rationalised thought, and 
hence against a separate cultural field for organised religion. Drawing on Marx and Engel’s 
description of structural differentiation in The German Ideology ([1845] 1994), Bourdieu 
proposes that the emergence of the city and with it an early form of the division of labour 
meant that ‘consciousness is in a position to emancipate itself from the world and to proceed 
to the formation of ‘pure’ theory, theology, philosophy, morality, etc.’ ([1971a] 1991: 6, 
citing Marx & Engels [1845] 1994: 130; cf. Fowler 2011). Following this line of reasoning, 
Bourdieu theorises that appeals to moral purity are facilitated by the material and practical 
differentiation of social fields. Yet following Weber ([1922] 1968: 536-40), Bourdieu treats 
the relations between religious professionals, between professionals and the laity, and 
between the laity, as crucial for the production of discourses of moral purity and impurity. 
Whereas functionalist perspectives treat purity and impurity discourses as a unmediated 
reflection of society as ordered or in chaos, Bourdieu argues strongly that this position misses 
out the role played by social practices within relatively differentiated fields as a crucial 
intermediary factor ([1997] 2000: 117).  
According to Bourdieu, the ‘systematisation and moralisation of religious practices 
and representations’ to form organised religion as an arena of social practice, was associated 
with a ‘transfer of the notion of purity from the magic order to the moral order’ ([1971a] 
1991: 8). Whereas magic had operated through the unsystematic enactment of rites and 
prohibitions which appealed to purity and impurity, the relatively autonomous religious field 
became structured by a continual discursive appeal to the essence of the world. Modelling his 
account on Chapter 7 of Weber’s ([1921] 1963) Ancient Judaism, which describes the 
‘monopoly’ the priesthood possess on access to salvation, Bourdieu argues that the 
priesthood have a monopoly on the legitimate appeal to God. This monopoly operates 
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through theological discourses appealing to purity and impurity as symbols of sin and 
redemption, which grant the priests a continuous authority over the laity ([1971b] 1987: 123): 
 
Religion contributes to the (hidden) imposition of the principles of structuration 
of the perception and thinking of the world, and of the social world in particular, 
insofar as it imposes a system of practices and representations whose structure, 
objectively founded on the principle of political division, presents itself as the 
natural-supernatural structure of the cosmos (Bourdieu [1971a] 1991: 5). 
 
The religious field comes to define itself through the ‘repression of worldly interests 
(economic but also sexual)’, such that these factors continue to operate, but in a masked form 
that is understood to express a ‘purer meaning’ ([1971a] 1991: 21, 9).  
Bourdieu’s analysis of the religious field suggests that the particular appeals that 
facilitate purity and impurity discourses are those that impute an ‘essence’ as the ground for 
reality. Comparing the artistic and religious fields, Bourdieu, for instance suggests that both 
are places in which competition occurs over the control and definition of phenomena taken to 
express ‘the origin, the spirit, the authentic essence’ ([1976] 1993: 74). Bourdieu is attuned to 
the fact that purity may mean different things in different contexts: there are a variety of 
essences against which to compare phenomena (beauty, truth, goodness, intention, etc.). 
However, Bourdieu’s writings also indicate certain commonalities between regions of 
practice where essence is invoked. We need to be careful in suggesting such an interpretation; 
Hacking (1999: 17) has pointed out that the term ‘essence’ has become a ‘slur word’, making 
its meaning unclear. The essences that we wish to identify as particularly associated with the 
operation of purity and impurity discourses do not contain any heterogeneous, foreign or 
inferior elements; all of their elements are ‘the same’ in some relevant sense. Furthermore, 
the essences in question are understood to be situated at the conceptual or ontological ground 
of their instantiations. Besides his consideration of the religious field, where this account first 
appears, this is especially visible in his analysis of the field of cultural production and 
consumption. 
 Written in 1971, the same year as ‘Genesis and Structure of the Religious Field’, 
Bourdieu’s essay ‘The Market of Symbolic Goods’ ([1971c] 1993) applies this analysis of the 
relatively differentiated religious field to cultural practices more generally. Like the religious 
field, spheres of cultural practice are separated in Western societies as relatively autonomous 
realms through the development of a ‘public of potential consumers’ and ‘an ever-growing, 
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ever more diversified corps of producers’, as well as ‘the multiplication and diversification of 
agencies of consecration’ ([1971c] 1993: 112). In particular, Bourdieu documents the 
discourses of purity and impurity that arose as the result of the emergence of modern high 
culture, the domain of elite cultural production and consumption. As techniques of mass 
production proliferated, in ‘reaction’ to ‘the pressures of an anonymous market’, from around 
1830 the Romantic movement in Europe proposed an ‘ideology of free, disinterested 
“creation”’. The artist came to be constructed as a pure ‘creative genius’, as were those 
dominant consumers ‘whose understanding of works of art presupposes’ a similar elevated 
and purified form of existence ([1971c] 1993: 114).  
Cultural goods that position themselves against the popular, ‘are ‘pure’ because they 
demand of the receiver a specifically aesthetic disposition’ ([1971c] 1993: 119-20). They are 
rare precisely to the degree that the disposition and knowledge to decipher their meaning is 
rare, and valuable because they serve to consecrate more broadly the social and political 
power possessed by those with this disposition. The classificatory social and cultural 
structures of the field of practice thereby serve as a ‘system of conservation and cultural 
consecration’ separating different consuming publics from one another in lifestyle, and 
seemingly in their very nature ([1971c] 1993: 122). Thus even sexuality – which Bourdieu 
sees as generally coded as impure in the first instance – is an effective site for demonstrating 
elevation and refinement of taste for those whose cultural capital permits such displays, for 
example in the form of an elevated ‘pure love’ or a ‘purely’ aesthetic relation with an artwork 
with a sexual theme ([1979] 1984: 80). The products of the field of cultural production can be 
mobilised as symbolic capital: cultural resources that serve to tacitly naturalise relations of 
cultural and material stratification in society ([1979] 1984: 382; [1997] 2000: 240-2). The 
strong association between symbolic capital and purity in Western societies is caused by the 
fact that a common way in which these cultural resources naturalise relations of power is 
through making forms of subjectivity appear to be no more than the expression of or 
‘phototropic’ orientation towards essence – such as adoration in the religious field or in love 
relations, or knowledge in the educational and academic fields.  
Though Bourdieu’s main focus is social class, he also explores purity and impurity 
discourses in relation to gender. Generalising from his fieldwork in Algeria in the 1950s to 
contemporary Western societies, Bourdieu ([1998a] 2001: 28) suggests that the ‘demeanour 
which is imposed on Kabyle women [in Algeria] is the limiting case of what is still imposed 
on women, even today, as much in the United States as in Europe’. Bourdieu suggests that 
women are situated as a ‘source from which impurity and dishonour threaten to enter’, with 
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the purity of cultivated feminine nature always at risk of being breached by either an inner 
tendency or an external vulnerability to impurity. The construction of the feminine as either 
pure or impure legitimates masculine possession, protection and control of women to ensure 
that impurity does not enter; masculinity is situated as relatively pure – and this relative 
purity serves as a tacit norm against which the purity or impurity of women are compared 
([1998a] 2001: 20, 51; [1972] 1977: 60-1; cf. Mottier 2002).  
Such generalisations in Bourdieu’s work between Algerian and contemporary 
Western societies have been criticised by commentators (e.g. Calhoun 1993; Witz 2004; 
Bennett 2005; Urban 2005; Dianteill 2005). Yet alongside such generalisation, in Bourdieu, 
is recognition of the way that discourses of purity and impurity have been marked by the 
particular history of Western societies. Bourdieu suggests that purity and impurity should be 
understood as ‘concepts originally developed in the theological tradition’ of Christianity, 
which have been strategically ‘imported’ into the operation of other Western cultural fields in 
ideals of beauty, truth, morality, the natural, and so on ([1961] 1962: 110-1; [1992b] 1996: 
294; [1998a] 2001: 86, 176). These re-worked theological notions serve a concrete need in 
the present, ‘converting the theology of grace into a worldly, “society” ideology of good 
grace’ and thus pinning moral responsibility for social success or failure on to the individual 
subject ([2005] 2008: 11; Bourdieu & Passeron [1970] 1977: 129). 
 
Bourdieu’s advance  
 
Douglas theorised purity as an expression and affirmation of social order, and 
impurity as an expression of ‘matter out of place’. Bourdieu, however, argues explicitly 
against the ‘reductionist theory’ which treats ‘discourse’ as ‘the direct reflection of social 
structures’ contained in society, conceptualised as a single whole ([1971a] 1991: 5; [1999] 
2011: 119; cf. Robbins 2003). On our interpretation of Bourdieu, purity and impurity 
discourses are not the reflection of social structures: mediating between the discourses and 
embedded social forms are the strategic discursive practices of different relational subjects, 
acting within fields in which competing visions of ‘the origin, the spirit, the authentic 
essence’ are precisely a stake in this interaction (Bourdieu [1976] 1993: 74).  
In the cultural field, purity and impurity discourses are strategically mobilised in the 
affirmation of the specificity of the cultural field as a domain oriented towards essence, in the 
course of strategic social practice. The cultural field itself is characterised as pure, compared 
to the economic field which is characterised as impure; those areas of culture which are most 
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oriented towards ‘the origin, the spirit, the authentic essence’ are constructed as pure than 
others; and those regions of the field most proximate to this essence are seen as purer than 
those that are considered as worldly, and distant from this originary essence. Purity and 
impurity hierarchies may therefore come into conflict, simply bypass, or nest within one 
another, depending upon the various ways in which essence is appealed to within social 
fields.  
For instance, discourses invoking purity and impurity may be deployed by prophets 
and other ideologues, for example, against the compromises that consecrated authorities must 
make. They may also be deployed by these consecrated authorities themselves, in order to 
designate as defiled those activities which do not correspond to what is thereby imputed as 
the proper form of human life (see [1971a] 1991: 32). In the political sphere, for example, 
Bourdieu ([1981] 1991: 189) describes a dichotomy and structural conflict between 
ideologues and pragmatists, ‘those people, that is, who thus advocate a return to basics, to a 
restoration of the original purity; and, on the other hand, those people who are inclined to 
seek a strengthening of the party’. Or again, Bourdieu ([1984a] 1988: 62) describes the 
opposition between two poles of academia. The applied faculties such as law and medicine 
affirm the public utility of the academic field. Those faculties dedicated to ‘pure, rational 
knowledge’ such as mathematics, or philosophy, affirm the autonomy of the academic field 
as oriented towards the disinterested search for the truth of existence.  
Bourdieu’s theory has been criticised for over-emphasising the division between 
cultural producers and cultural consumers, and thus for focusing too strongly on intra-
institutional dynamics (e.g. Hervieu-Léger [1993] 2000: 110-1; Born 2008). Whilst this issue 
does mark Bourdieu’s texts on the religious, cultural and political fields, it is questionable 
whether it concretely impacts upon the interpretation we present of Bourdieu’s account of 
purity and impurity classifications. On this reading, purity and impurity discourses are both 
facilitated by and contribute to the emergence of institutionalised fields able to facilitate 
sustained discourses on the truth of reality, and on the extent to which particular phenomena 
or forms of subjectivity are in correspondence with this ideal. This reading of Bourdieu 
circumvents a certain strand in his thought which makes discourses of purity and impurity the 
necessary effect of the structural differentiation of relatively institutionalised social practice. 
The citation from Marx and Engel’s The German Ideology, and certain other passages in ‘The 
Genesis and Structure of the Religious Field’ (e.g. [1971a] 1991: 8), imply a structurally 
determinist account. In such an account, discourses such as purity and impurity would be no 
more than reflections of the relative autonomy of a field of social practice. Yet Bourdieu can 
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also be read as indicating that classifications occur within various, sometimes competing, 
discourses, rather than representing the super-structural reflection of material conditions. In a 
later interview, Bourdieu ([1999] 2011: 115-6) affirms that this was his intended point in 
‘The Genesis and Structure of the Religious Field’, and that it represents the most important 
lesson that he feels that he learnt from Weber.  
On such a reading of Bourdieu, the material division of labour represented by the 
relative autonomy of fields does not ‘spontaneously’ or mechanically produce purity and 
impurity discourses. For instance, the field of cultural production, the scientific field, and the 
field of national sovereignty do not naturally and inevitably produce corresponding 
discourses of purity and impurity. The reason why they are often associated with such 
discourses is that at stake in each of these relatively autonomous fields is an appeal to an 
essence; in these cases beauty, truth and the nation as a timeless truth of collective identity. 
Crucial for purity and impurity discourses is less the autonomy of the field than the appeal to 
an essence that is often associated with established, autonomous fields which have the 
authority to shape forms of subjectivity that are willing to make and recognise claims about 
the truth of existence. Thus in The Rules of Art, Bourdieu argues: 
 
If there is a truth, it is that truth is at stake in the struggle; and even though the 
divergent or antagonistic classifications or judgements made by agents engaged in 
the artistic field are indisputably determined or oriented by specific dispositions 
and interests linked to their positions in the field and to points of view, they are 
nevertheless formulated in the name of a pretention to universality, to absolute 
judgement, which is the very negation of the relativity of points of view. 
‘Essentialist thought’ is at work in all social universes and especially in the fields 
of cultural production – the religious field, the scientific field, the literary field, 
the artistic field, the legal field, etc. – where games which have the universal at 
stake are played out. But it is quite clear in that case that ‘essences’ are norms 
([1992b] 1996: 298-9; see also [1997] 2000: 114).  
 
Purity and power 
 
A concern that has been raised regarding Bourdieu’s work generally relates to his 
view of the relationship between structure and agency. There has been a sustained debate in 
the literature on Bourdieu, regarding whether he believes that social structures are 
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constraining or whether agency is possible (see McNay 2004). Whilst in some texts, 
Bourdieu does indeed seem to argue against the possibility of meaningful agency for most 
subjects (e.g. [1976] 1993: 73-4; Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992a: 133), elsewhere he is insistent 
that practices are not simply the result of ‘rules’ which subjects follow or express, but the 
result of strategic agency by social and institutional actors ([1972] 1977: 120; 1986a: 111). 
On the topic of purity and impurity discourses, Bourdieu’s argument is quite clear: they tend 
to support incumbent relations of material and cultural power, but this does not preclude their 
successful use by actors for achieving greater agency or substantial social change (see 
[1992b] 1996: 342). Bourdieu suggests that ‘the more people are... rich in specific capital, the 
more likely they are to resist’ cooption by right-wing interests ([1996a] 1998: 61-2, 70). 
Representations of purity tend to support the hierarchies of the social field and society at 
large by serving as symbolic capital, naturalising forms of subjectivity so that they appear to 
be no more than expressions of an imputed essence. Yet they can also serve as a legitimation 
strategy through which particular actors can offer social critique. It is possible, Bourdieu 
theorises, that ‘in the name of the values of purity, freedom, truth...  I can enter the political 
field’, campaigning for ‘reason, truth, virtue’ ([1995a] 2005: 46; [1997] 2000: 123; cf. 
[1998b] 1998: 95-6; [2001] 2003). 
Bourdieu suggests that the political potency of such representations of purity in the 
public domain is, in part, because the economic and political fields are socially constructed in 
contemporary Western societies as impure: ‘The order of the polis and politics’ is always 
seen as opposed to ‘the “free” and “pure”’ ([1997] 2000: 15, 94). Those rich in cultural rather 
than material capital are oriented towards ‘cultivated cults of the natural, the pure and the 
authentic’ ([1979] 1984: 218-220). Bourdieu ([1986b] 1993: 165) calls these subjects ‘the 
dominated of the dominant’, since they are less powerful than the economically and 
politically dominant, whose forms of subjectivity are legitimated as dominant through their 
consumption of the goods of the fields of cultural production. Bourdieu ([1979] 1984: 511) 
thus writes of the ‘boundary which distinguishes the pure reign of art and culture from the 
lower region of the social and of politics, a distinction which is the very source of the effects 
of symbolic domination exerted by or in the name of culture’.  
Dominant actors strive for and exercise their power, but occlude and legitimate these 
actions through the mobilisation of what Bourdieu refers to as ‘ideals’, produced and 
sustained in the first instance by other, ‘purer’ fields ([1981] 1991: 202; [1997] 2000: 96). 
Such interaction between the purity and impurity discourses of different fields is missed by 
Douglas, and represents a crucial advance made by Bourdieu’s account. Bourdieu proposes 
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that dominant subjects gain legitimacy as social elites by discursively constructing 
themselves as representatives and guardians of these pure and transcendent ideals: ‘I am 
nothing but the delegate of God or the People, but that in whose name I speak is everything, 
and on this account I am everything’ ([1983b] 1991: 210-1; [1995b] 1999: 25; cf. [1998a] 
2001: 87-8). Discourses invoking purity can thereby be used to legitimate programmes of 
action, and to impose a particular vision of the world on the national citizenry via ‘the statist 
capital granting power over the different species of capital and over their reproduction’ 
([1991] 1998: 41-2; see also [1980a] 1991:47; 1987: 819, 824; 2004: 26). The relative and 
vicarious proximity of the dominant to essence is ‘unmarked’ and so appears to subjects as a 
‘universal’ potential, a ‘neutral’, ‘natural’ norm and ideal ([1998a] 2001: 122; Bourdieu & 
Wacquant 1992a: 167). This is perhaps what Douglas was identifying in suggesting that 
purity functions as a symbol of society as a whole; however, Bourdieu identifies the 
intersecting power-relations upon which such a function depends. 
Such a process can be seen in Bourdieu’s discussion in The State Nobility ([1989] 
1996) of ‘pure activities, that is, activities that have been purified of all profane, pragmatic, 
and profitable purpose’ (e.g. certain amateur sports, forms of music, debating, ancient 
languages). These pure activities are available in elite educational institutions, and 
demonstrate ‘the qualities of disinterestedness and endurance’. These qualities show that a 
subject is able to exercise ‘control over nature, that is to say, over those who cannot control 
their nature’: the ability to rule oneself serves as a mandate to rule others ([1989] 1996: 110-
1, citing Durkheim [1912] 2001: 235). Mastery of the cultural realm as the domain of ‘the 
pure’ makes social power and authoritative forms of knowledge the seemingly natural 
possession of the dominant elite, granting them a tacit and relative purity (Bourdieu [1980b] 
1991: 85; [1989] 1996: 102-3, 110; cf. Bourdieu & Passeron [1970] 1977: 119). Bourdieu 
theorises that dominant subjects in contemporary Western societies are represented as 
possessing a tacit and relative purity. By contrast, an impure subject-position is relatively 
attributed across human society, depending on properties like class and gender and the way in 
which these are enacted with propriety or impropriety in the domain of consumption. Impure 
forms of subjectivity may seem to represent no more than that which is extraneous to a fully-
human, ‘proper’ subject-position. However, Bourdieu’s account suggests that such a figure 
may in fact be part of the means through which this subject-position is socially and materially 
constructed and made to seem ‘proper’ and pre-given. 
Bourdieu’s account of themes of purity and impurity shows the important role they play 
in the processes through which contemporary Western societies continually construct ‘a 
12 
 
whole relationship to animal nature, to primary needs and the populace who indulge in them 
without restraint’, such as women and the working-classes ([1972] 1977: 196; [1998a] 2001: 
79). Though appearing as the expression of their ‘impure nature’, the actions and capacities 
of the dominated are in fact, Bourdieu insists, shaped by their materially subordinate position. 
This position practically necessitates association with matters classified by the dominant 
culture as impure, such as physical labour, dirt, and lasciviousness ([1979] 1984: 386-7; 
[1998a] 2001: 31-3). Bourdieu writes of the dominant: 
 
They reduce the strength which the dominated (or the young, or women) ascribe 
to themselves to brute strength, passion and instinct, a blind, unpredictable force 
of nature, the unreasoning violence of desire, and they attribute to themselves 
spiritual and intellectual strength, a self-control that predisposes them to control 
others ([1979] 1984: 479). 
 
On our reading, Bourdieu’s writings suggest that one of the fundamental properties of 
discourses of purity and impurity is that they hide their relationship with dynamic relations of 
power and materiality (see [1991] 1998: 60). What is the mechanism through which this takes 
place? Though Bourdieu does not draw this out explicitly, we wish to suggest that when 
phenomena or forms of subjectivity are taken to be unadulterated, simple expressions of their 
essence – that is, as pure – they tend to be granted a moral and epistemological privilege. 
With no heterogeneous processes impacting upon the existence of the phenomena or form of 
subjectivity, it appears that only a universal and immutable essence stands as the ground of a 
phenomenon or a particular form of subjectivity. Bourdieu proposes that those who are 
dominant within a field, and within society more generally, can hide the historicity and the 
power-relations upon which their position in society depends by presenting themselves as no 
more than delegates of an ideal of essence. This legitimates their place in society, and situates 
their attributes and ethos as the universal norm. Rather than expressing and re-affirming 
society as a collective entity, the mobilisation of purity and impurity discourses is structured 
by hierarchies both within and beyond particular cultural fields as differentiated realms of 
social life: ‘the most “pure” products, “pure” art or “pure” science’ serve what would 
otherwise be considered the ‘totally “impure” social functions’, most notably ‘distinction and 
social discrimination or, more subtly, the function of a disavowal of the social world which is 
inscribed’ ([1992b] 1996: 249). 
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Douglas proposes representations of purity and impurity as an unmediated expression 
of the maintenance or breach of any social or cognitive categories that reflect the general 
social structure. Designations of purity and impurity regarding the boundaries of the body, 
Douglas therefore argues, always mirror the internal and external social and symbolic 
boundaries of society as a pre-given ‘bounded system’ ([1966] 2002: 142). Examining 
virginity, Douglas ([1966] 2002: 200-1) argued that it will inevitably be coded as pure since 
‘the yearning for rigidity is in us all’. She explains that by this she means that through the 
figure of the virgin, we can ‘enjoy purity at second hand’, experiencing this state which we 
all inherently desire vicariously in the untainted body of the virgin. The more general fact that 
themes of impurity seem to ‘cluster’ particularly around both sexuality and femininity is 
explained by Douglas ([1966] 2002: 194) as simply natural to human societies, as she does 
not believe that it can be adequately accounted for using her theory.  
By contrast, on the account presented here, purity and impurity should be regarded as 
discourses that measure phenomena vis-à-vis an imputed essence, considered to be the self-
identical ground for true phenomena in the world. Impurity is invoked to classify those 
elements that particular discursive actors are unwilling or unable to place as expressions of 
the particular construction of essence. Representations of purity and impurity can thus serve 
to bridge the gap between ostensibly natural and discrete phenomena or forms of subjectivity, 
whilst facilitating mechanisms of social stratification and of social and self-regulation. Thus 
femininity and sexuality should not be regarded as natural and inevitable sites of purity and 
impurity classifications; a social theory that suggests such risks affirming rather than 
providing tools for the analysis of misogyny, as Buckley and Gottlieb (1998) have claimed. 
Rather, we wish to contend, female sexuality is often described using purity/impurity 
classifications because it is a key biopolitical object, able to be regulated and normalised 
through appeal to an ideal of human essence. For instance, the division between pure and 
impure forms of female sexual subjectivity is an apparatus which serves to manage and mask 
the contingencies that attend the material and discursive construction of racial identities as 
essences. In order to appear to be an essence underpinning particular human instances, ‘race’ 
is indelibly dependent upon the exigencies of the reproductive choices of its members who 
therefore must be subject to self-regulation and social policing. ‘Race’ appears to be a trans-
historical essence that is merely instantiated by each generation of the nation; however, in 
fact the race is indelibly dependent upon the exigencies of the reproductive choices of its 
members who therefore must be subject to self-regulation and social policing.  
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Concluding reflections 
 
As Douglas predicts in Purity and Danger, pure phenomena can sometimes appear to 
symbolise the order and benevolence of society, and the impure its disequilibrium or 
disruption by anomaly. Bourdieu himself ([1979] 1984: 474-5) maintains that there is a 
tendency in contemporary Western societies to exclude ‘all misalliances and all unnatural 
unions – i.e. all unions contrary to the common classification, to the diacrisis (separation) 
which is the basis of collective and individual identity’. Yet not all exclusions are classified 
as impure, and not all that is within social or cognitive bounds is classified as pure. Our 
reading of Bourdieu suggests a new theory of purity and impurity: purity should be 
conceptualised as the adjudication of phenomena in terms of their relative identity with or 
divergence from their imputed essence. Bourdieu may focus on the economic processes that 
are euphemised in the cultural activities of social actors, but his point regarding the role 
played by purity and impurity can be extended to a variety of cases. It can be suggested, 
based on his account, that discourses of purity and impurity are mobilised to manage the 
practical tensions associated with the construction of particular subjects or phenomena as 
relatively corresponding to an imputed ideal, standing outside of history or relations of 
power.  
Through the discursive adjudication of phenomena or subjects as relatively impure or 
pure, an image is constructed of what these phenomena or subjects are in their truth. Impurity 
does not spontaneously characterise any anomaly, as Douglas predicts, but is invoked to 
classify those elements that particular discursive actors are unwilling or unable to place as 
expressions of an imputed essence. In contrast to Douglas who sees power as only ever 
operating to ensure the homeostatic stability of the social and cognitive structure of the 
community as a whole, our reading of Bourdieu has suggested that pure processes, things, or 
people appear to be simple expressions of essence, with no dependence on anything outside 
of themselves. They are devoid of and prior to complexity and the dynamics that organise 
social and material inequalities. This makes purity and impurity a discursive, material and 
affective resource peculiarly adapted to facilitating social consensus, and compelling a shared 
practical demand to protect or attain purity through the deployment of mechanisms of social 
exclusion, and social and self-regulation. Purity and impurity, therefore, help manage and 
mask the tensions that would otherwise become apparent when an essence is imputed at the 
ground of particular phenomena or forms of subjectivity, as the impure is held 
epistemologically and morally responsible for the distance of reality from its essential truth. It 
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is this operation which facilitates the mobilisation, identified by Moore (2000), of purity and 
impurity discourses in the justification of black-and-white and dehumanising world-views. 
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